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Abstract
The privatization deems to be an important policy
towards to the solutions of public ownership faults.
However, the privatizing a monopoly industry could not
damage the consumers’ interests inevitably. Thus, it is
necessary to introduce the government regulation
towards to the privatized monopoly industry. The
premises of the privatization combined with regulation
model are: controlling the privatization of a monopoly
industry shall increase the efficiency, improved service
quality and lower the costs to consumers.
The method for this research is to review existing
literature and study the regulations and the regulation in
the developed nations comparing their variations and to
find out the most efficient regulation models to design or
amend for other nations. The objective of this study is
to study the privatization experiences from the existing
nations and convert to those nations may need for
reference.
At the end, this paper also found that the effective
regulation model may not only bring down the costs of
the public services, but also improved the efficiency to a
near market competition standard.
1. Introduction
This research paper looks at price capping theory and
considers a case study, which explores incentives and
relevant financial and technical points of price capping
regulation.
The paper will explore the optimal
regulation framework which endorsed the price capping
regulation framework (Laffont & Tirole , 1993); it will
explore the Productivity Measurement with Adjustments
for Variations in Capacity Utilization in price capping
regulation theory and consider some conclusions and
implications.
In 1994, research in the UK power industry found that
privatization was not directly related to the improvement
of productivity in the post-privatization era. (Burns and
Weyman-Jones, 1994).
Significantly, the research
study on which these findings were based ended in 1993,
before the introduction of price capping regulation and
before the intensification of industry competition
occurred.
It missed the valuable opportunity to
measure and compare productivity performance under

price capping reduction, versus market comp etition.
In contrast, recent studies from the electricity association
of UK found: that privatization has almost doubled the
productivity of the electricity industry. (Electricity
Association， 1998， p.55). In the electricity industry,
effective price regulation and more fierce market
competition have resulted in a lowering of profit margins
after peaking in 1989-90 and further resulted in an
improvement of service quality. Household electricity
costs have fallen at a rate of approximately 2.5% per
annum after the privatization of the electricity industry.
Commercial users experienced similar discounts and the
prices are further negotiable subject to usage. The
privatization of local electricity distributors has generally
achieved higher profit margins and reduced the need to
recruit employees.
The privatization of the gas corporations also achieved
similar results. Once profit margins peaked in
1990~1991, prices have continued to fall, reflecting
effective price regulation and intense competition in the
gas industry. Actual prices for average households
have fallen by 2.6% per annum. Commercial and
industrial gas prices have also fallen at a rate of 5% per
annum. At the same time, service quality has also
improved significantly, including the discounted rate of
gas pipes, improved safety records, and improved usage
of gas pipes. While UK gas corporations have lowered
their pipeline buildup and grown their services gradually,
new entrants into the gas industry have expanded their
business more aggressively to maintain the growth of the
total service quantity supplied.
On the whole, consumers only increased their actual
expenses in water and sewerage services, especially
those consumers who were charged according to the
sizes of their properties. However, water and sewerage
price increases were supported by industry regulation
offices (but the growth rate remained within a
permissible range) because suppliers had to meet the
European Union criteria and make new investments in
infrastructure. Today, water quality and certain service
items have greatly improved.
The struggle however, to meet these criteria is reflected
by 25% of the sewerage industry which cannot meet the
government requirement. The frequency of interrupted

water supply has grown and water pipe leakage has also
become a public concern.
This is especially
problematic as water companies continue to enjoy high
profit margins.
As such, the water supply regulator has instructed water
companies to implement certain actions to lower the rate
of water pipe leakage. The water supply regulator has
raised the issues and its intention to tighten regulation
and to lower the actual water prices in their next review
in 1999-2000. While the regulator may intervene in
the case of extraordinary price increases, the UK
regulator remains committed to prices which reflect the
real cost of supply.
From the perspective of employment, it is clear that total
employment opportunities did not suffer from
privatization.
While
privatization
may
lower
employment opportunities in existing firms and
organizations, new entrants still require new employees
to compete with existing State-Owned-Enterprises
(S.O.E.).
In the telecommunication industry for
example, British Telecom has conducted a few large
scale redundancies over the years, but total employee
numbers have actually increased.
In addition,
redundancies are frequently voluntarily and with
generous severance packages.
The experience of privatization indicates that, effective
regulation can increase productivity, lower prices, and
improve quality producing greater economic benefit.
Furthermore, the profit margin of privatized enterprises
also tends to fall in the longer term. Newly privatized
enterprises normally achieve higher surplus as a result of
better costs control and less stringent governmental
regulations in the initial stages of privatization. The
main reason for softer regulations is that this will help
gain support from ni vestors in the privatization effort.
Upon completion of the privatization, the regulator
begins to tighten the conditions of price increases and
provides incentives to introduce greater competition.
The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is also an effective
index which deems future profits as zero investment
capital while converted into monetary terms. The IRR
is being adopted as an instrument of comparison with the
Return on Investment (ROI) or the profit margin. Thus,
we can compare the ROI with capital costs in privatized
enterprises which are regulated. Under competition,
the normal ROI will tend to reflect or be close to capital
costs. While capital costs are based on lending costs,
the proprietor’s weighted average is based on equity. In
the UK, the capital costs of a privatized enterprise can be
viewed as more valuable than government bonds, but in
general enterprises it is considered less than the
proprietor’s equity.
The main reason for this is that while privatized
enterprises remained dominant in the market, the
regulator must ensure that they possess sufficient

financial capability. This lowers the risk of investing in
privatized industries compared to other general
enterprises, where capital costs or ROI are also lower.
For example, the telecommunication regulation office set
nominal capital costs between 8.4% - 13.4% for the
telecommunication industry in the UK when actual
capital costs are between 5.2%-8.8%. Generally it is
true to say that the regulator sets the price capping based
on actual capital costs to enable regulated enterprises to
achieve 7% of actual ROI.
In some cases in the UK, for example with the British
Gas Company and with British Telecom, investors do not
receive the pro-normal ROI from investing in privatized
enterprises until after an extended period,. The reasons
for privatized enterprises achieving pro-normal ROI
include the government wishing to privatize enterprises
successfully by underestimate the share price and the
regulator getting involved with the regulation of pay
increases.

2. Literature Review
Comparison between price capping regulation vs.
rate of return regulation
Price capping regulation is closely related to inflation.
Price capping is modified based on inflation and the
efficiency factor. The efficiency factor is used to reflect
the scale of productivity progress and in the UK, is
symbolized as X. Price capping regulation is reviewed
every 4-5 years. For instance, the price cap for British
Telecom was initially set at RPI 3; then reduced to RPI
4.5 in 1989; adjusted to RPI 6.25 in 1991 and RPI 7.5 in
1993.
The objectives of price capping regulation are to amend
or simplify the rate of return, which involved the “agreed
rate of return” (Littlechild, 1989).
At the start of the privatization of British Telecom,
services were 60% under the price capping regulation.
Services have currently been lowered to 25%. This has
illustrated the maturing of market competition.
Price capping, however, is under attack from many areas.
This type of regulation has two major flaws. The first is
the lack of motivation to lower the operation costs
because increased costs can be transferred to consumers.
The second is the ease of over-expanding investment
because the profit is expressed as a rate of return on
assets and new assets normally achieve a better rate of
return( Averch and Johnson，1962).
At the opposite end, high costs may not be passed on to
its customers. Enterprises generate revenue when the
cost-down rate is significant lower than efficiency
factors.
Thus, enterprises commonly improve
performance regardless of operations or capital.
However, costs and price may move in opposite
directions after a period of time which may cause
inefficient distribution of resources, (P?MC). Moreover,
the public will question the effectiveness of

governmental regulations as high profits continue to be
generated
For these reasons, the methods of calculation of price
caps are reviewed every 4-5 years to maximize the
results of the regulation.
Governments have
encouraged enterprises to raise prices within the set and
acceptable range as happened in water companies.
Government would also permit regulators to adjust the
price capping calculation methods in unusual
circumstances as in the case of British Telecom in 1991.
Governments, however, refrain from intervening with
prices once price capping calculations are formalized.
Any inappropriate intervention in regulated enterprises
would substantially affect internal performance.
Although one research study pointed out that price
capping regulation is simpler than the rate of return
regulation (Littlechild ， 1988 ， P.56), price capping
regulations have more complexity and are dispute in
terms of manipulation. For instance, in the case of
applying the rate of return regulation, there is much
complex data involved such as enterprises assets, finance
and forecasts of costs and revenue. For price capping
regulation to work, complex enterprises and industry
data are needed. However, price capping regulation
requires almost as much data as the rate of return
regulation. Currently, the regulation office requires
more and more complex financial models to forecast the
financial status of the regulated enterprise.
An
effective forecast model would require for instance, a
nationwide forecast of demand; a model of costs and
productivity relationships; future production costs (e.g.
labor costs) and advanced price allocation efficiency in
relation to fixed assets.
The objective of the modeling process is to establish a
price regulation model. The price regulation model is
aimed at assisting regulated enterprises achieve above
normal return owing to industry uniqueness or monopoly
unless the cost-down margin is lower than the efficiency
factors. However, the normal rate of return is very
difficult to calculate and requires precise capital costs.
The calculation formula always raises disputes between
the relevant parties. This also happens with the rate of
return regulation law in the US. Apart from capital costs,
the size of the asset radix and the methods of
amortization are also controversial in both the UK and
the US. While price capping regulation in the UK model
aims to avoid the flaws in the US model, there remain
many questions in the UK model.
The experience in the UK has shown that pricing
variables are subject to the asset radix and the negotiated
rate of return regardless of price capping regulation or
the rate of return regulation. Since assets are sold at a
discounted value during privatization, many concerns
have been raised in areas such as purchasing costs,
replacement costs and book values. For instance, the
water company was sold at 90% of its actual

replacement value while the gas corporation was sold at
60% of its replacement value. In this case, it is crucial
to evaluate the asset radix of the price capping
regulation. .Generally speaking, investors should not
receive extraordinary profit from their investment
amount which should include purchase costs. (Vass,
1997).
In proposing the X factors, the regulators compromised
on the method of calculation. They decided on the cash
flow model over the short term, which can allow a larger
tolerance in net asset evaluation. The objective of the
pricing formulae is to provide the regulated enterprises
sufficient financial capability to fulfill the current and
future public demand for investment.
In this model, the asset value is calculated based on its
net book value or current value. The return to investors
is over-valued during the privatization. However, if the
asset value were calculated during the progress of
privatization, for example when the purchase costs are,
frequently under valued, more accurate values would
result. Although, this may lower windfall gains from the
price variation between the actual asset value and its
purchase values, this would enable another variation
between investors’ rate of return and the return rate in
the corporate accounting system. Thus, the practice
accounts not support a model which went against
accounting theory.
After many years of privatization, the regulation office
finally took contingency actions to address the issues
within privatization. For instance, with Transco (the
former pipeline and storage department of the UK Gas
Corporation), the monopoly and acquirer association
included the asset purchase costs during the process of
privatization as part of the index figures. The result of
such action caused the windfall gain of investors to
disappear and a price fall for its consumers. However
when asset replacement is required, this means higher
replacement values and service costs would rise
dramatically (Fulwood, 1997; Newbery, 1997; Vass,
1997).
This would enable a wealth distribution
opportunity for customers although this calculation
would also enable customers not to pay for actual costs.
Asset evaluation became a good case study. Simpler
regulation was insufficient as the situation turned
complicated and controversial. Also, the UK regulator
frequently intervened without following its review
schedule when any consumers’ disputes arose or new
competitors entered the market. These actions caused
many disputes and complaints between the regulator and
the regulated enterprise.
For instance, the
telecommunication regulation office intervenes more
times in British Telecom than when it was a
State-Owned-Enterprise.
The regulation office
intervened in pricing, quality control, the rates
equilibrium control and in consumer satisfaction matters
(Souter，1994:p.109). The CEO of British Telecom, Sir
Valence, criticized the regulation environment in the UK

as hostile and unpredictable (Lapsley and Kilpatrick,
1997:p.81).
This also occurred in other industries. The relationships
between the gas regulation office and its regulated
enterprises were on the edge of rupture. The water
regulation office intervened twice during the first
five-year regulation period.
The regulation office
forced water enterprises to lower prices so as to share
profits with its customers and even intervened in the
bonus scheme of the enterprise. As a general rule in
price capping regulation, bonus schemes of the regulated
enterprises should not be an issue for the regulation
office.
The regulator may amend the code of an unpredictable
game. In this way the regulator and the regulated
enterprises shall establish a stricter “regulation contract”
or negotiate a clear code of conduct between two parties
(European Policy Forum， 1996, Parker, 1997b). The
price capping regulation since 1983 was designed by
Professor Littlechild to minimize unnecessary and
detailed governmental intervention. While it failed to
minimize governmental interventions, it is highly
efficient in encouraging corporate management to reduce
internal inefficiency and lower service costs. The
results of all types of governmental interventions in
corporate strategies and economic behavior remain
questionable but it is clear that negative effects have
resulted.
Unexpected regulation intervention may lower the
motivation for enterprises to improve efficiency because
the improvement rate must exceed the X-factor to
generate short term profits for shareholders. The major
motivation for the regulator to pursue better efficiency is
for short term profit and to be able to use this as an
important index for corporate improvements in
efficiency. However, regulated interventions aim to
redistribute profits generated from this efficiency
improvement to customers rather than shareholders.
Regulated enterprises may lower efficiencies and waste
resources to minimize profit and therefore avoid its
prices being reviewed by the regulator. Similarly, there
is a likelihood of wasted resources and lower efficiencies
if the regulator intervenes in bonus distributions to
shareholders.
The valuable experience of the UK regulation model that
other nations can take on board is that price capping
regulation is not simpler than rate of return regulation
and does not use less information. In fact, both
regulation models required the same amount of
information. Furthermore, the regulator should amend
regulations according to the review schedule and should
not attempt to intervene to enhance operational
efficiency. The regulator may intervene in regulated
enterprises when there are pressures from governments,
consumers and market competitors.

Regulators feel intervention is necessary to protect
consumers from the high profiteering of regulated
enterprises. Price capping regulation should introduce
reforms to replace an annual bonus system or the profit
sharing system (Burns，Turvey and Weyman－Jones,
1995). Profit sharing methods have caused a high level
of concern in the UK and worldwide, as the design and
costs incurred by the profit sharing system were disputed
and not discussed revealing the intention of some
enterprises to hide profits.
The profit sharing system is based on the price capping
regulation but may be misunderstood and seen to be
another system altogether.
In fact, price capping
regulation includes the profit sharing system. High
profits are designed to show in following review periods,
and do not reflect annual systems of profit sharing
system.
We can prove the theory in the following case. Assume
£1 per annum was generated from efficiency
improvement. We assume an 8% conversion rate and
that the cost-down would reflect in higher profits. If all
things remained equal, the final benefits would be
distributed as 32% to investors while 68% would be
distributed to consumers.
The detail calculation per below:
PV of £ 1 for 5years @ 8% / PV of £ 1 in
perpetuity @ 8% = 3.99/12.49 = 31.95%
The premise of this formula is that the net value of the
efficiency improvement per £1 (assume 8%) would be
returned to enterprise investors per five-year review
period. After the five-year period, the net value of the
efficiency improvement per £1 would be returned to
consumers. Furthermore, the X-factor requires that
32% efficiency improvement benefits be distributed to
enterprises investors while the rest of the 68% is
distributed at a lower price to all consumers. The
above 32/68 proportion is based on the assumption that
the regulated enterprise shows improvement in the first
year of the five-year period. If the improvement takes
place after a few years, consumers enjoy greater benefits
after the distribution. If the premise of the above
calculation did not change till the fifth year, then the
proportion between consumers and investors would be as
high as 7/93. Therefore, price capping regulation is a
profit sharing system where the timing of the benefit
distribution is disputed. In price capping regulation, the
consumers could be awarded their share of the profits
ahead of the Investors.

3. The theory of incentive regulation
The theoretical foundation of incentive regulation in
public utilities is the notion of optimal regulation. At
present, there are two performance evaluation directions
of the incentive regulation theory - the price capping
regulation and the yardstick regulation. The Incentive
regulation aims to induce regulated enterprises to
improve efficiency, quality and the overall performance.
The regulator adopts an intervention strategy to
encourage the industry to embrace competition, to award
those who uphold the regulation and punish those
violating the regulation. Incentive regulation in public
utilities adopts a framework of principle-agent
relationships, where the regulator is the principle and
regulated enterprises are the agents.
Both parties
tend to maximize its effective functions; where the
regulators aim to maximize the social welfare function
while regulated enterprises aim to maximize profits.
The economic incentives of price capping regulation
have forced telecommunication network operators to
increase or maintain service quality. According to one
case study on telecommunication network operators, a
substitution
relationship
was
found
between
effectiveness and quality (Northworthy & MacDonald,
1994). The substitution relationship literally means
consumers still pay the same prices even though service
quality is down graded. Therefore the quality index
should be incorporated as a contingency method for the
calculation of total productivity. Thus, as service
quality decreases, total productivity should fall
accordingly. For instance, there are 18 states in USA
which include ‘service quality’ as an item in its call rate
evaluation.
There are three states which include
‘service quality’ in price capping regulation schemes.
Quality index data was collected from the open data of
ARMIS (Automated Reporting Management Information
System). However at present, there is not any reputable
open data available in Taiwan.
Incentive regulations which aim to be successful in the
telecommunication industry should include a thorough
price index. A price index should incorporate significant
indices and performance criteria such as the total
turnover of the telecommunication services, customers
groups, total demand, a telecommunication quality index,
capital costs and a measure for efficiency. Performance
measurement indices play a significant role in total
productivity, marginal costs, quality and technical
improvement (Norsworthy and Tsai, 1999: p?).
Performance indices enhance price capping regulations
and the implementation of incentive regulation by
maximizing the function of economic incentives.

4. The foreign regulation experience
This section explores the advantages and disadvantages
of the public utilities privatization model in the UK.
This model is now becoming the worldwide privatization
template.

The most significant advantage has been to enable
former state-owned enterprises (now privatized
enterprise) to improve efficiency and to increase benefits
for investors and consumers. In general, consumers
benefit in two ways - from lower service costs and
higher service quality, except in water and sewerage
services. In the case of water and sewerage services,
low levels of investment prior to privatization resulted in
the need for the investment of large funds to improve
service quality.
These investment costs were
transferred onto the consumers.
Investors have
benefited from privatization regulation laws, sometimes
with extraordinary profits. These huge profits have
frequently raised much public concern.
On the downside, price capping regulation law did not
work as easily as formulated in 1983. Price capping
regulation must incorporate operational costs, capital
costs and demand growth into the calculation model.
The regulated enterprises must also agree to the capital
costs, and asset evaluation as per the requirement of the
price capping regulation. Asset evaluation is an area of
dispute because of the huge variance among the share
price, net value and replacement value.
This is
commonly regarded as if the enterprise privatized at
discounted values.
It seems that privatization under regulation achieves
better performance, especially when a more appropriate
system is still in the making. The regulator and the
regulated enterprises should learn from the mistakes of
regulation failures. A significant phenomenon was the
reduction in high profitability at the early stage of
privatization after tighter regulation was introduced and
competition was intensified. Those nations interested
in privatization and the privatization regulation may look
to the UK experience.
In particular, the following points may be noted:
(1) The direct intervention of government departments
into privatized enterprises may not offer the best solution
and incentive for efficient and effective regulation. In
privatized monopoly enterprises, a regulation office with
a detailed plan and review mechanism would offer more
effective economic performance and improvement and
would benefits both investors and consumers.
(2) The positioning of the regulation as an opposing
force between the regulator and the regulated enterprise
is another point for consideration. While business aims
to make profits for its investors, the regulator aims to
minimize the profits from the regulated enterprises in
order to benefit the consumers. This conflict can be
seen to strengthen the relationship between the regulator
and the regulated enterprise.
The relationship is
optimal at a certain level of opposition. Conversely,
concerns are raised if both parties have close and steady
relationships.
This leaves room for unethical
exchanges of information and even lobbying on the part
of privatized enterprises to receive favorable treatment

and weakening the protection of consumers.
(3)Price capping regulation may not be easy to
implement as it requires planning and as much
information as the rate of return regulation. However,
price capping regulation can lead to lower supply costs if
spot regulation interventions were not allowed prior to
the set review date. In the long term, the benefits
resulting from lower costs would benefit consumers. The
only problem is the presence of high profits in the short
term, which would attract public criticism.
(4)Huge profits generated by regulated enterprises raise
public concern and complaints are targeted at
monopolized enterprises.
Regulators are often
pressured by the public to intervene in regulated
enterprises that enjoy high profits. However such
intervention lowers the efficiency motivation of the price
capping regulation within the regulated enterprise. The
difference between the price capping regulation and the
rate of return regulation would diminish within the term
of the review as the huge profits are remo ved.
(5)Regulation simulates or serves as a substitution for
competition in the marketplace to enable the regulated
enterprises to improve its performance.
However
unlike the true competition, man-made regulation cannot
fully stimulate performance imp rovement and further
raises some public concern. Thus, the regulator is
likely to introduce more competition as long as this leads
to improved economic performance. Prior to 1999, the
telecommunication, gas and power generation industries
remained State-Owned-Enterprises. The water supply
industry remained monopolized even though the UK
government tried to aggressively introduce competition
into the industry (DOE ， 1996; Robinson ， 1997).
Regulations should enable and encourage newcomers
rather than acting as a hurdle into the industry.
(6)In the UK, the regulator must report to the related
minister and the parliament regarding all regulatory
actions. At the same time, the independent regulation
must take place from the substance mode of the
regulation rather than the formality mode. The work of
the regulator lies in its expert opinion in its area of
jurisdiction and the continuity of its policies rather than
its reporting function. The work of the regulator should
also be less concerned with social and political issues
such as income redistribution. The balance between
independence and public accountability could be
threatened if the regulator is required to report its
activities to the general public and if political
interventions overwhelm its independence. In some
nations, an over-centralized, single regulator is less
acceptable than a regulator with open and democratic
procedures. Furthermore, a committee-style or
panel-type of regulation organization is replacing the
existing single regulator model and public hearings and
juridical examinations are added to enforce the
regulations.

The UK experience has shown that effective regulation
and privatization can energize a lethargic S.O.E., and can
benefit consumers. It is important to note that the UK
model is built on a specific political and economic
system. Thus, the UK regulation model cannot simply
be transferred to other political systems or nations but
must be adapted and modified to the local environment.

The experience of price capping regulation in both
the UK and the US
There are two methods of price capping regulation in
both the UK and the US. The first is gain-sharing price
capping regulation and the second is the sliding-scale
price capping regulation. (Need more information on
these 2 types of regulation. How does this relate to the
next paragraph?)
In the telecommunication industry, network operators
can benefit from the huge economic incentives brought
about by regulation and can share these benefits with
their customers. This can occur if price cap menus take
into account the distribution mechanisms needed when
setting the range of the X-factors. As the X-factors
increase, the lower proportion of productivity profits is
shared with customers. For instance, in 1995 in setting
the federal price capping menus, the FCC (the Federal
Communication Commission, of USA) raised its
X-factors from 3.3% to 4.0%. In this case, if the
telecommunication network operators chose the smallest
X-factors, then they would have to distribute all the
targeted productivity profits to their customers. If the
network operators chose the largest X-factors, then they
would not have to distribute any of the targeted
productivity profits to their customers. Furthermore, if
the network operators chose the median X-factors, then
they would have to distribute the targeted productivity
profits to their customers proportionally.
This scenario has led to five out of the seven Regional
Bell Operating Companies (R.B.O.C.s) choosing the
maximum X-factors while claiming that average
productivity growth was not expected to exceed 3%. It
is obvious that there are issues regarding asymmetrical
data existing between the regulation office and the
regulated enterprises.
Telecommunication network
operators tend to partially hide costing information in
order to seek higher prices which then justify the higher
X-factor target.
Therefore, in such cases, selective price cap menu
regulation can more clearly reveal the cost structure
information in regulated enterprises and would add to the
amount of information held by the regulator. This type
of regulation would resolve cases of asymmetrical data.
Price capping regulation and the X-factor has played a
significant role in economic incentives. Apart from
being an index for costing structure and operational

performance for telecommunication network operators, it
is also an entry point for incentive regulation by the
regulator.
In the US, the process of outlining and finalizing the
regulation was open and consultative. The FCC
organized many open conferences in order to gather
information and opinions across the board. This led to
the development of a strategy to support the
telecommunication network operators.
The FCC,
however, decided on the final version of the price
capping regulation.
The key points in the regulation included the calculation
of X-factor, the amendment method of the X-factors, the
sharing system and the linkage of X-factor, and
regulation for external costs. Thus, the procedure was
justified as conscientious but without being aggressive.
In the US, however, the FCC was empowered to legislate
its own regulation which is not the case in other nations,
such as Taiwan. If Taiwan adopted the same kind of
regulation, for example, it would probably cost more to
implement.
The
Department
of
General
Telecommunication (DGT) may encounter costs from
lengthy time delays as parties with vested interests
attempt to intervene in the regulation by lodging relevant
proposals to parliament for auditing. Unlike the UK
experience, where the regulator negotiates the price
capping formula with network operators directly and
proposes all necessary indexes, such as the X-factor, the
DGT in Taiwan does not possess the necessary power
and may be further undermined by public skepticism.

5. The regulation experience in Taiwan
In general, the telecommunication industry has begun to
experience liberalization due to breakthrough
technologies, a booming service industry and
government awareness of the need for global
competitiveness. The US began its liberalization of the
telecommunication industry from the 1980’s, and this
trend was followed by many other nations including the
UK, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and members of the
EU..
In Taiwan, the government has not been able to ignore
global trends of liberalization and faces strong demands
from local business and foreign Telco investors alike.
This has enabled Taiwan to increase its competitiveness
in a couple of ways. Firstly Taiwan has been able to
transform itself into a regional transit center and
secondly, it has been able to join the WTO and thus meet
the demands of liberalization from local business and
foreign investors.
In Taiwan, the telecommunication industry underwent a
fundamental transformation based on two factors. The
first factor was the speed of breakthrough technology

which dynamically transformed and made possible the
liberalization of the domestic industry. The second factor
was the liberalization and deregulation of the
telecommunication
industry
worldwide.
The
liberalization of the telecommunication industry in
Taiwan was based on fair competition enabling new
market entrants to compete with the existing
monopolized operator. This further increased
competitiveness
among
the
worldwide
telecommunication industry.
Structural and legal reform began in Taiwan in January,
1996 when three telecommunication laws were legislated.
The monopolized industry was privatized into
Chung-Hwa Telecom, separating operational and
administrative
functions.
In
1997,
the
telecommunication industry was further classified into
two categories of business operations - the mobile
networks and international direct dial business (IDD).
The market continued to be liberalized.
By the end of 1997, the mobile network carriers had
been liberalized. By 1999, the satellite carrier’s network
had been liberalized. By 2001, the telecommunication
industry had liberalized all its services to all its licensed
service carriers including the local exchange, long
distance calls , international direct dials, broadband
exchange and data exchange.
In May, 1997, the regulator of the telecommunication
industry in Taiwan, the DGT, announced that it intended
to replace the existing remuneration regulation rate with
price capping regulation. The objectives of price
capping regulation were to enable telecommunication
network operators to have greater flexibility with pricing
and profit while battling in the fierce competition
environment under liberalization. In order to achieve
the objectives, the price capping regulations included the
incentive of costs reduction, and limited the previous
monopolized advantages of Chung-Hwa Telecom in the
market.
This research study looks at the process of legislating the
price capping regulation which is economically oriented
and based on economic and technical considerations. It
further discusses the directions of governmental
regulations and the process of formulating a more
optimal regulation which is productive, rewarding and
innovative.
According to the 26th Clause of the telecommunication
(where is this from? Is it a charter, is it a piece of
regulation? Please define): price capping regulation is
only suited to the 1st type of telecommunication business
and stands as the general code for the industry (Mao,
1998). At the moment, currently the Department of
Transportation has amended this clause.
Price capping regulation was first presented by
Littlechild in 1983 and then adopted to implement the

privatization of British Telecom in 1984. Price capping
regulation was further adopted by the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) in the US during the
early nineties. Currently, the theory of price capping
regulation is widely adopted in telecommunication
liberalization around the world, in countries including
the USA, the UK, Canada and many European nations.
The main reasons for the wide adoption of the theory are
the incentive for economic efficiency and performance
regulation. The most distinguishing characteristics of
price capping regulation are that telecommunication
network operators must achieve productivity goals set by
regulations and that the rewards may be greater than
under the previous remuneration rate regulation.
The idea of price capping theory with the X-factor of the
price capping regulation was based on the goal of
growing productivity. This concept also reflected if the
telecommunication network operators had achieved the
productivity goal, and then formulated the price within a
maximum price range. If a telecom network operator
achieved the productivity goal of the designated period,
they were entitled to keep the super profit after
deducting all operational costs and normal profit margins.
The regulator would then reset the price capping
maximum for the next period based on the performance
of the previous period.
The productivity growth rate (the X-factor) is a
significant factor in the study of price capping regulation
which is used to set productivity growth targets for
telecommunication network operators. Price capping
formulae need to achieve effective economic efficiency
incentives and performance regulation. From the point of
view of consumers, higher productivity growth targets
mean higher economic performance and higher
economic returns could easily be achieved. In the
longer term, price caps would be adjusted downwards by
telecommunication network operators.
The lower
productivity growth target would cause a higher price
capping goal. Thus, the network operators would
achieve a higher rate of return and after-tax profit with
costs-down operational policies and an improvement of
service quality.
The incentive mechanism of price capping theory is
derived from asymmetric data in an optimal regulation
framework.
Under price capping regulation, the
regulator cannot easily predict the real costs of every
type of telecommunication service and may not be able
to accurately forecast cost savings due to managerial and
technical improvements.
However, the regulatory
office may be able to design price capping formulae or
various
regulation
contracts
to
induce
telecommunication network operators to pursue
maximum profit and cost reduction strategies.
The
regulation office may be able to design optimal price
capping formulae or suitable regulation contracts which
encourage telecommunication network operators to
pursue profits, by selecting the best cost-down measures

which reflect actual cots.
When formulating the incentive mechanism of price
capping regulation, the regulatory office must take into
account two factors. The first factor is that network
operators may reduce service quality to achieve
cost-down results and the second factor is that network
operators previously achieved profits from cross
subsidization by operating both regulated and
non-regulated telecom businesses.
For instance, in the U.S, local exchange carriers
(L.E.C.s ) operating in the local distance call market had
to compete against inter-exchange carriers (I.X.C.),
which were permitted to operate a local exchange service
to compete with existing LECs. When there is cross
subsidization, the long distance exchange and local
exchange may not compete as fiercely as expected.
Moreover, the improvement in the service quality of the
LEC would be very limited if there were no real ma rket
competition.

6. Conclusion and its implications
This paper discusses the direction of governmental
regulation in the area of price capping regulation and
how to formulate optimal regulations prioritizing
productivity, incentive investment and innovation.
Laffont & Tiro1e (1993), endorsed optimal regulation as
the goal of any price capping regulation framework.
Price capping regulation and the method to induce more
cost effective productivity and quality was further
explored.
After the WTO classified the telecommunication
industry as a global trading system and liberalization led
to a maturing of the of the telecommunication industry, it
was seen that price capping regulation would be better
suited to a competitive market structure. Therefore this
research is based on a new type of dynamic economic
model with capital input. It has explored the incentives
of price capping regulation and illustrated the
measurement of total productivity in price capping
regulation. It has looked at price capping regulation
and sliding scale regulation from both economic and
technical viewpoints during the process of liberalization
in the telecommunication industry.
In the US, price capping regulation in 1991 and the
Telecommunication Act of 1996 achieved several
outcomes. Some phone users enjoyed the benefits of
updated technology and there was competition among
local exchange carriers. Furthermore proposed
production growth goals were achieved despite fierce
competition.
Many economic and finance regulation theories are
based on asymmetric information.
Incentive
mechanisms of price capping regulation are based on
telecommunication network operators having a sound

knowledge of costs and know-how in order to setup the
incentive contract.
Telecommunication network
operators claim that price capping regulation has caused
a drop in productivity, but in the case of the UK and the
US, it has been shown that telecommunication
enterprises can achieve high profitability from efficiency
and increase benefits to customers. To ensure success
of selective price capping regulation in the US,
telecommunication network operators were allowed to
choose preferred contracts in authorized business
categories.
To enable the general public to benefit from increased
productivity and quality, and lower prices from
competition, price capping regulation formulae must
incorporate a design of the optimal service index which
includes measurement of service quality. While the
substitution relationship between productivity and
service quality has been proven in the US, in an
emerging market, like Taiwan, the measurement of
service quality methods and research methods must be
linked to the index of price capping regulation.
Current accounting procedures do not offer the best
information-gathering system for the telecommunication
industry. Telecommunication network operators are
frequently not called on to demonstrate the performance
of the industry and pricing is not based on individual
costs. In Taiwan, the DGT and Chung-Hwa Telecom
came under public attack with complaints of unfairness,
sloppy administrative procedures and lack of openness,
when they tried to implement the call rate rationalization
by addressing the telecommunication rate adjustment
scheme. Public criticism also focused on the lack of
detailed information for example in the case of the
method for calculating the amortization of personnel
costs. The difficulty was that the system did not
distinguish between each type of business costs in the
amortization of costs.
In Taiwan, the accounting
system for the telecommunication industry is based on
the unified accounting procedures of the auditing
department of the Executive Yuan, which is calculated
based on departmental rather than on the rate of specific
services or amortization.
It is clear that the research and control of the costing
structure is very important. Thus it is crucial to
establish a cost accounting system as a first priority.
Telecommunication network operators must comply with
the accounting procedures of the governmental auditing
system and with corporate costs analysis and operating
income accounting.
The findings of this paper indicate that regulation issues
in the telecommunication industry are not simply
domestic issues, but are a global phenomenon. In the
future, the telecommunication industry will be faced
with domestic and international competition. Therefore,
consideration must be given to foreign competitors when
formulating regulations. In this regard, the WTO has

played a significant role in the telecommunication
industry by regulating competition and by acting as a
major influence on the liberalization of the fundamental
structure of telecommunication services and the direction
of operations. As a result, Taiwan has adopted the new
regulation model more quickly in order to improve
operational performance by domestic telecommunication
companies. In addition, the government is paying
closer attention to the WTO conferences and decisions
which help align the domestic telecommunication
industry in Taiwan with international competition.
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